Worth reading if you are a tenant or having trouble with your mortgage

Page 1 of 3 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON SUSPENSION OF FORECLOSURES AND EVICTIONS DURING THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY WHEREAS, Pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, Article IV, § 18, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is granted authority as the administrative head of the Judicial Branch of the State, including the closing of courts in the State of Maryland and non-court judicial facilities; and WHEREAS, The Court of Appeals has approved Chapter 1000 of Title 16 of the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure setting forth the emergency powers of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals; and WHEREAS, In instances of emergency conditions, whether natural or otherwise, that significantly affect access to or the operations of one or more courts or other judicial facilities of the State or the ability of the Judiciary to operate effectively, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may be required to determine the extent to which court operations or judicial functions shall continue; and WHEREAS, Due to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, and consistent with guidance issued by the Centers for Disease Control, an emergency exists that poses a threat of imminent and potentially lethal harm to vulnerable individuals who may come into contact with a court or judicial facility and personnel; and WHEREAS, To the extent possible, the courts and judicial offices and units have remained operational and provided scheduled and required events while balancing the health and safety needs of court visitors and personnel during the early stage of this emergency; and Page 2 of 3 WHEREAS, Escalation of the emergency has required comprehensive measures to protect the health, safety, and well-being of Maryland residents and Judiciary personnel; and WHEREAS, The Administrative Order on Statewide Judiciary Restricted Operations Due to the COVID-19 Emergency filed March 16, 2020, authorizes the courts’ consideration or resolution of matters that can be addressed without a proceeding that involves testimony or argument; and WHEREAS, Foreclosures of residential property, foreclosures of the right to redeem residential property sold in a tax sale, and residential evictions present the strong likelihood of creating undue hardship if completed during the pendency of the emergency, NOW, THEREFORE, I, Mary Ellen Barbera, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and administrative head of the Judicial Branch, pursuant to the authority conferred by Article IV, § 18 of the Maryland Constitution, do hereby order this 18th day of March 2020, as follows: (a) Those foreclosures of residential properties and foreclosures of the rights of redemption of residential properties pending in the circuit courts shall be stayed effective immediately; and (b) Residential eviction matters pending in the District Court of Maryland and all pending residential eviction orders shall be stayed effective immediately; and (c) New foreclosure of residential property, foreclosure of rights of redemption after a tax sale, and residential evictions shall be stayed upon filing; and (d) To the extent that this Administrative Order conflicts with extant Administrative Orders, local judicial orders or memoranda, this Administrative Order shall prevail; and Page 3 of 3 (e) This Administrative Order will be revised as circumstances warrant. /s/ Mary Ellen Barbera Mary Ellen Barbera Chief Judge Court of Appeals of Maryland Filed: March 18, 2020 /s/ Suzanne C. Johnson Suzanne C. Johnson Clerk Court of Appeals of Maryland

District court update

DISTRICT COURT NOTICE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY - COVID 19 PANDEMICTHE DISTRICT COURT IS CLOSED UNITL APRIL 6, 2020BY ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS MANDATORY CASES HEARD DAILY     BAIL REVIEWS      BENCH WARRANTS     BODY ATTACHMENTS      EMERGENCY EVALUATION PETITION      QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION VIOLATIONS ACCESS LIMITED TO LAWYERS, LITIGANTS FOR THESE CASES AND CREDENTIALED MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA ONLY EMERGENCY CASES HEARD IN THE COURT’S DISCRETION     DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDERS     CRIMINAL COMPETENCY      MOTIONS REGARDING           EXTREME RISK PROTECTIVE ORDERS           DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDERS/CUSTODY/GUNS/VACATE HOME           PEACE ORDERS           CONTEMPT HEARINGS-PEACE AND PROTECTIVE ORDERS           MATTERS FOR LOCALLY INCARCERATED DEFENDANTS YOU MAY FILE A REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING/RULING:     PROVIDE PHONE CONTACT.      A CASE MAY BE BY PHONE OR REMOTE VIDEO (SKYPE OR ZOOM, ETC.)      A CASE MAY BE AFTER THE EMERGENCY PERIOD HAS ENDED      A CASE MAY BE DECIDED WITHOUT A HEARING.       **THE CLERK’S OFFICE IS CLOSED** FILING PLEADINGS                                     US MAIL                                                         DROP BOX 8:30 AM-4:30 PM* M-F                COMMISSIONER-4:30 PM-8:30 AM & SAT/SUN  MAKING PAYMENTS US MAIL DROP BOX 8:30 AM – 4:30 PM*M-FONLINE – 24 HOURS ALL OTHER CASES ARE CONTINUED AND WILL BE RESET BY MAIL NO BENCH WARRANT WILL ISSUED QUESTIONS – CALL 301-563-8800 – 8:30 AM – 4:30 PM COMMISSIONERS OFFICES ARE OPENRockville - 191 E. Jefferson Street -- OPEN 24/7/365Central Processing Unit - 1307 Seven Locks Rd -- OPEN 24/7/365Silver Spring – 8552 Second Avenue -- OPEN 8AM-12AM DAILY GO TO THE COMMISSIONERS OFFICE TO:      FILE FOR CRIMINAL CHARGES     INITIAL APPEARANCE ADVICE OF RIGHTS     POST BAIL/BOND      SATISFY A BENCH WARRANT      DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION      PEACE ORDER PROTECTION      EXTREME RISK PROTECTIVE ORDER PROTECTION *AVOID GROUPS OF OVER 10 PEOPLE *REMAIN 6 FEET AWAY FROM OTHERS *IF YOU HAVE ANY OF THESE SYMPTOMS AND YOU ARE SAFE, GO HOME & CONTACT YOUR DOCTOR      RUNNY NOSE      SORE THROAT      COUGH      FEVER      DIFFICULTY BREATHING CALL 911 FOR EMERGENCY HELP Patricia Mitchell District Six Administrative Judge3.19.2020

Worth reading actually:

CONSTITUTION OF MARYLAND

ADOPTED BY THE CONVENTION

Which Assembled at the City of Annapolis on the Eighth Day of May, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-seven, and Adjourned on the Seventeenth Day of August, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-seven, and was Ratified by the People on the Eighteenth Day of September, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-seven [with Amendments through Two Thousand and Eighteen (including amendments proposed by the General Assembly and ratified by the voters November 6, 2018)].

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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

We, the People of the State of Maryland, grateful to Almighty God for our civil and religious liberty, and taking into our serious consideration the best means of establishing a good Constitution in this State for the sure foundation and more permanent security thereof, declare:

Article 1. That all Government of right originates from the People, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole; and they have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their Form of Government in such manner as they may deem expedient.

Art. 2. The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the State; and the Judges of this State, and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Art. 3. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution thereof, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people thereof.

Art. 4. That the People of this State have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and police thereof, as a free, sovereign and independent State.

Art. 5. (a)

(1) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to them from, or under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.
(2) Legislation may be enacted that limits the right to trial by jury in civil proceedings to those proceedings in which the amount in controversy exceeds $15,000 (added by Chapter 422, Acts of 2006, ratified Nov. 7, 2006; amended by Chapter 480, Acts of 2010, ratified Nov. 2, 2010).

(b) The parties to any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is preserved are entitled to a trial by jury of at least 6 jurors.

(c) That notwithstanding the Common Law of England, nothing in this Constitution prohibits trial by jury of less than 12 jurors in any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is preserved (amended by Chapters 203, 204, Acts of 1992, ratified Nov. 3, 1992).

Art. 6. That all persons invested with the Legislative or Executive powers of Government are the Trustees of the Public, and, as such, accountable for their conduct: Wherefore, whenever the ends of Government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the People may, and of right ought, to reform the old, or establish a new Government; the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.

Art. 7. That the right of the People to participate in the Legislature is the best security of liberty and the foundation of all free Government; for this purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent; and every citizen having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought to have the right of suffrage (amended by Chapter 357, Acts of 1971, ratified Nov. 7, 1972).

Art. 8. That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.

Art. 9. That no power of suspending Laws or the execution of Laws, unless by, or derived from the Legislature, ought to be exercised, or allowed.

Art. 10. That freedom of speech and debate, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any Court of Judicature.

Art. 11. That Annapolis be the place of meeting of the Legislature; and the Legislature ought not to be convened, or held at any other place but from evident necessity.

Art. 12. That for redress of grievances, and for amending, strengthening and preserving the Laws, the Legislature ought to be frequently convened.

Art. 13. That every man hath a right to petition the Legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner.

Art. 14. That no aid, charge, tax, burthen or fees ought to be rated or levied, under any pretense, without the consent of the Legislature.

Art. 15. That the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be prohibited; that paupers ought not to be assessed for the support of the government; that the General Assembly shall, by uniform rules, provide for the separate assessment, classification and sub-classification of land, improvements on land and personal property, as it may deem proper; and all taxes thereafter provided to be levied by the State for the support of the general State Government, and by the Counties and by the City of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform within each class or sub-class of land, improvements on land and personal property which the respective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to the tax levy; yet fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly be imposed, or laid with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community (amended by Chapter 390, Acts of 1914, ratified Nov. 2, 1915; Chapter 64, Acts of 1960, ratified Nov. 8, 1960).

Art. 16. That sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far as it is consistent with the safety of the State; and no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter.

Art. 17. That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.

Art. 18. That no Law to attaint particular persons of treason or felony, ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter.

Art. 19. That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land.

Art. 20. That the trial of facts, where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People.

Art. 21. That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.

Art. 22. That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case.

Art. 23. In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.

The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $15,000, shall be inviolably preserved (amended by Chapter 407, Acts of 1949, ratified Nov. 7, 1950; Chapter 789, Acts of 1969, ratified Nov. 3, 1970. Transferred from Article XV, secs. 5 and 6, by Chapter 681, Acts of 1977, ratified Nov. 7, 1978. Amended by Chapters 205, 206, Acts of 1992, ratified Nov. 3, 1992; Chapter 322, Acts of 1998, ratified Nov. 3, 1998; Chapter 480, Acts of 2010, ratified Nov. 2, 2010).

Art. 24. That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land (amended by Chapter 681, Acts of 1977, ratified Nov. 7, 1978).

Art. 25. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted, by the Courts of Law.

Art. 26. That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.

Art. 27. That no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.

Art. 28. That a well regulated Militia is the proper and natural defence of a free Government.

Art. 29. That Standing Armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised, or kept up, without the consent of the Legislature.

Art. 30. That in all cases, and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to, and control of, the civil power.

Art. 31. That no soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, except in the manner prescribed by Law.

Art. 32. That no person except regular soldiers, marines, and mariners in the service of this State, or militia, when in actual service, ought, in any case, to be subject to, or punishable by Martial Law.

Art. 33. That the independency and uprightness of Judges are essential to the impartial administration of Justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of the People: Wherefore, the Judges shall not be removed, except in the manner, and for the causes provided in this Constitution. No Judge shall hold any other office, civil, or military or political trust, or employment of any kind, whatsoever, under the Constitution or Laws of this State, or of the United States, or any of them; except that a judge may be a member of a reserve component of the armed forces of the United States or a member of the militia of the United States or this State; or receive fees, or perquisites of any kind, for the discharge of his official duties (amended by Chapter 61, Acts of 1990, ratified Nov. 6, 1990).

Art. 34. That a long continuance in the Executive Departments of power or trust is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities of permanent freedom (amended by Chapter 681, Acts of 1977, ratified Nov. 7, 1978).

Art. 35. That no person shall hold, at the same time, more than one office of profit, created by the Constitution or Laws of this State; nor shall any person in public trust receive any present from any foreign Prince or State, or from the United States, or any of them, without the approbation of this State. The position of Notary Public shall not be considered an office of profit within the meaning of this Article. Nonelected membership in the militia of this State, a law enforcement agency, a fire department or agency, or a rescue squad shall not be considered an office of profit within the meaning of this Article; nor shall any remuneration received as a consequence of membership in a reserve component of the armed forces of the United States or of membership in the militia of the United States or of this State be considered a present within the meaning of this Article (amended by Chapter 129, Acts of 1964, ratified Nov. 3, 1964; Chapter 61, Acts of 1990, ratified Nov. 6, 1990; Chapter 80, Acts of 1996, ratified Nov. 5, 1996).

Art. 36. That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief; provided, he believes in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor either in this world or in the world to come.

Nothing shall prohibit or require the making reference to belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any governmental or public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony, school, institution, or place.

Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion (amended by Chapter 558, Acts of 1970, ratified Nov. 3, 1970).

Art. 37. That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this Constitution.

Art. 38. Vacant (amended by Chapter 623, Acts of 1947, ratified Nov. 2, 1948. Repealed by Chapter 681, Acts of 1977, ratified Nov. 7, 1978).

Art. 39. That the manner of administering an oath or affirmation to any person, ought to be such as those of the religious persuasion, profession, or denomination, of which he is a member, generally esteem the most effectual confirmation by the attestation of the Divine Being.

Art. 40. That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.

Art. 41. That monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government and the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suffered.

Art. 42. That no title of nobility or hereditary honors ought to be granted in this State.

Art. 43. That the Legislature ought to encourage the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the extension of a judicious system of general education, the promotion of literature, the arts, sciences, agriculture, commerce and manufactures, and the general melioration of the condition of the People. The Legislature may provide that land actively devoted to farm or agricultural use shall be assessed on the basis of such use and shall not be assessed as if sub-divided (amended by Chapter 65, Acts of 1960, ratified Nov. 8, 1960).

Art. 44. That the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and of this State, apply, as well in time of war, as in time of peace; and any departure therefrom, or violation thereof, under the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive of good Government, and tends to anarchy and despotism.

Art. 45. This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the People.

Art. 46. Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex (added by Chapter 366, Acts of 1972, ratified Nov. 7, 1972. Amended by Chapter 681, Acts of 1977, ratified Nov. 7, 1978).

Art. 47. (a) A victim of crime shall be treated by agents of the State with dignity, respect, and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process.

(b) In a case originating by indictment or information filed in a circuit court, a victim of crime shall have the right to be informed of the rights established in this Article and, upon request and if practicable, to be notified of, to attend, and to be heard at a criminal justice proceeding, as these rights are implemented and the terms "crime", "criminal justice proceeding", and "victim" are specified by law.

(c) Nothing in this Article permits any civil cause of action for monetary damages for violation of any of its provisions or authorizes a victim of crime to take any action to stay a criminal justice proceeding (added by Chapter 102, Acts of 1994, ratified Nov. 8, 1994).

Coronavirus and current court schedule

Below is from the Bar Association for Montgomery County. It is helpful if you are a litigant.  It was put out on 16 March 2020:

Call the courthouse before going to Court.  One, check to see if your matter is being heard.  Two, if your matter is being heard, is there an option to appear telephonically?  The Court is working on how to have more attorneys and litigants appear remotely.

The Rules Committee is meeting today to decide what rules need to be changed temporarily.  We know an extension of the Hicks waiver is being discussed.  Unclear if discovery rules will be extended. 

Sheriffs will be at the doors of the Circuit Court building starting today and if you don’t need to be in the building for one of the matters listed below or on the docket, you won’t be let into the building. 

The dropbox outside Court will be available for filings.  Will be checked every 30 min. during business hours.

These matters are considered emergencies and will still be heard:

Bail reviewsArraignmentsEmergency habeas corpus
Juvenile detention hearings/emergency detention hearingsCINA shelter and adjudications on shelter careDom. vio. pro. petitionsAppeals from peace ordersFamily law emergenciesTemporary restraining ordersEmergency eval petitionsQuarantine/isolation petitions    -will go to J. Greenberg and will be held remotelyExtraditionsHicks waivers determinationsSearch warrantsBody attachmentsContempt

If I am your attorney you can call me and I will figure it out for you.

Thoughts on Passenger Opening the Door and Injuring a Bicyclist

What can happen when a driver stops or vehicle in the traveled portion of the roadway adjacent into the left of the bicycle route and the passenger opens the door into that bicycle route? Well, obviously a bicyclist can run into the door injuring herself significantly.

Who is responsible? The driver? The passenger? The bicyclist? Some combination?

I think a proper legal analysis requires concentration on the facts.

This accident happened in Washington DC. In this case the driver stopped the vehicle in the traveled portion of the roadway. The obligation on the driver when stopping to let someone out would be to pull over as far to the right as is practicable. In this case the driver did not do so. The failure of her to do so led to the passenger opening the door causing the collision with the bicyclist. My opinion the driver was negligent for failing to follow the rules of the road and it was reasonably foreseeable that a cyclist would be coming from the right. I believe that the driver is responsible.

The analysis continues. The passenger has an obligation to use reasonable care when getting out of a vehicle. In fact in this case the passenger opened the passenger  door into adjacent traffic in violation of District of Columbia municipal regulation.  Rule 18-2214.4 states, “No person shall open any door of a vehicle unless it is reasonably safe to do so and can be done without interfering with moving traffic, bicyclists, or pedestrians and with safety to such person and passengers.”  Because of that negligence, because of that statutory violation, there was a collision between the bicyclist and the passenger door. I believe that the passenger is also responsible.

Under the common law when two or more people are responsible for their negligent acts they can be held jointly and severally liable for their negligence. In other words, claims would be made against both the driver and the passenger.

Yet the analysis continues. Is the bicyclist responsible? Historically, Washington DC embraced the common-law rule of contributory negligence which states that if the plaintiff is 1% at fault that would be a complete bar to recovery. In other words, if the cyclist was not paying full time and attention, was going to quickly, was intoxicated, was otherwise distracted, some fault could be attributed to the cyclist and it could be a complete bar to recovery.

In 2016 the law was changed in Washington DC.

§ 50–2204.52. Contributory negligence limitation.
(a) The negligence of a pedestrian, bicyclist, or other non-motorized user of a public highway involved in a collision with a motor vehicle shall not bar the plaintiff's recovery in any civil action unless the plaintiff's negligence is:

(1) A proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and

(2) Greater than the aggregated total amount of negligence of all of the defendants that proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.

(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to:

(1) Change or affect the doctrine of joint and several liability or the last clear chance doctrine; or

(2) Reduce the legal protections provided to pedestrians and cyclists under:

(A) § 7-1004; or

(B) § 50-1606.

The way I read this rule is that the bicyclist's claim is only barred if his negligence is greater than 50% of the negligence in the accident.

In my case the accident happened so suddenly that the cyclist had no chance to react. He was properly riding his bicycle, the cyclist had no clue that the door was about to pop open in his path.

I was able to persuade the insurance company insuring the driver of the merits of my client's case and we were able to resolve the matter favorably for my client.

I am a lifetime Washington Area Bicycle Association member and would be pleased to assist you in your bicycle accident related matters.

Updates on Shielding Protective Order Cases

The state of Maryland has become more generous in providing shielding of protective orders. Initially, protective order cases could only be shielded if they were dismissed or the petitioner's request was denied. Currently, if the respondent consents to a protective order, without a finding of abuse, the respondent is eligible to at least petition the court to have the matter shielded from public record. The 2019 statute is below.

It is often wise to consider shielding a domestic violence case if possible. If someone is doing a background check and this sort of information comes up it can be viewed in a negative manner. Please call me if I can assist you or advise you in shielding your domestic violence case.

Section 4-512. Shielding of records.
(a) Definitions. --
(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.

(2)
(i) "Court record" means an official record of a court about a proceeding that the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps.

(ii) "Court record" includes:
1. an index, a docket entry, a petition, a memorandum, a transcription of proceedings, an electronic recording, an order, and a judgment; and

2. any electronic information about a proceeding on the website maintained by the Maryland Judiciary.

(3) "Shield" means to remove information from public inspection in accordance with this section.

(4) "Shielding" means:
(i) with respect to a record kept in a courthouse, removing the record to a separate secure area to which persons who do not have a legitimate reason for access are denied access; and

(ii) with respect to electronic information about a proceeding on the website maintained by the Maryland Judiciary, completely removing all information concerning the proceeding from the public website, including the names of the parties, case numbers, and any reference to the proceeding or any reference to the removal of the proceeding from the public website.

(5) "Victim services provider" means a nonprofit or governmental organization that has been authorized by the Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention to have online access to records of shielded protective orders in order to assist victims of abuse.

(b) Written request. --
(1) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, if a petition filed under this subtitle was denied or dismissed at the interim, temporary, or final protective order stage of a proceeding under this subtitle, the petitioner or the respondent may file a written request to shield all court records relating to the proceeding in accordance with subsection (d) of this section.

(2) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, if the respondent consented to the entry of a protective order under this subtitle, the petitioner or the respondent may file a written request to shield all court records relating to the proceeding in accordance with subsection (e) of this section.

(c) Timing. -- A request for shielding under this section may not be filed within 3 years after the denial or dismissal of the petition or the consent to the entry of the protective order, unless the requesting party files with the request a general waiver and release of all the party's tort claims related to the proceeding under this subtitle.

(d) Notice, hearing, and findings. --
(1) If a petition was denied or dismissed at the interim, temporary, or final protective order stage of a proceeding under this subtitle, on the filing of a written request for shielding under this section, the court shall schedule a hearing on the request.

(2) The court shall give notice of the hearing to the other party or the other party's counsel of record.

(3) Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, after the hearing, the court shall order the shielding of all court records relating to the proceeding if the court finds:
(i) that the petition was denied or dismissed at the interim, temporary, or final protective order stage of the proceeding;

(ii) that a final protective order or peace order has not been previously issued against the respondent in a proceeding between the petitioner and the respondent;

(iii) that the respondent has not been found guilty of a crime arising from abuse against the petitioner; and

(iv) that none of the following are pending at the time of the hearing:
1. an interim or temporary protective order or peace order issued against the respondent in a proceeding between the petitioner and the respondent; or

2. a criminal charge against the respondent arising from alleged abuse against the petitioner.

(4)
(i) On its own motion or on the objection of the other party, the court may, for good cause, deny the shielding.

(ii) In determining whether there is good cause under subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the court shall balance the privacy of the petitioner or the respondent and potential danger of adverse consequences to the petitioner or the respondent against the potential risk of future harm and danger to the petitioner and the community.

(5) Information about the proceeding may not be removed from the Domestic Violence Central Repository.

(e) Notice, hearing, and findings -- After expiration of protective order. -- (1)
(i) If the respondent consented to the entry of a protective order under this subtitle, the petitioner or the respondent may file a written request for shielding at any time after the protective order expires.

(ii) On the filing of a request for shielding under this paragraph, the court shall schedule a hearing on the request.

(iii) The court shall give notice of the hearing to the other party or the other party's counsel of record.

(iv) Except as provided in subparagraph (vi) of this paragraph and subject to subparagraph (v) of this paragraph, after the hearing, the court may order the shielding of all court records relating to the proceeding if the court finds:
1. for cases in which the respondent requests shielding, that the petitioner consents to the shielding;

2. that the respondent did not violate the protective order during its term;

3. that a final peace order or protective order has not been previously issued against the respondent in a proceeding between the petitioner and the respondent;

4. that the respondent has not been found guilty of a crime arising from abuse against the petitioner; and

5. that none of the following are pending at the time of the hearing:
A. an interim or temporary peace order or protective order issued against the respondent; or

B. a criminal charge against the respondent arising from alleged abuse against an individual.

(v) In determining whether court records should be shielded under this paragraph, the court shall balance the privacy of the petitioner or the respondent and potential danger of adverse consequences to the petitioner or the respondent against the potential risk of future harm and danger to the petitioner and the community.

(vi) Information about the proceeding may not be removed from the Domestic Violence Central Repository.

(2)
(i) If the respondent consented to the entry of a protective order under this subtitle, but the petitioner did not consent to shielding at the hearing under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the respondent may refile a written request for shielding after 1 year from the date of the hearing under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(ii) On the filing of a request for shielding under this paragraph, the court shall schedule a hearing on the request.

(iii) The court shall give notice of the hearing to the other party or the other party's counsel of record.

(iv) Except as provided in subparagraph (vi) of this paragraph and subject to subparagraph (v) of this paragraph, after the hearing, the court may order the shielding of all court records relating to the proceeding if the court finds: 1. A. that the petitioner consents to the shielding; or
B. that the petitioner does not consent to the shielding, but that it is unlikely that the respondent will commit an act of abuse against the petitioner in the future;

2. that the respondent did not violate the protective order during its term;

3. that a final peace order or protective order has not been previously issued against the respondent in a proceeding between the petitioner and the respondent;

4. that the respondent has not been found guilty of a crime arising from abuse against the petitioner; and

5. that none of the following are pending at the time of the hearing:
A. an interim or temporary peace order or protective order issued against the respondent; or

B. a criminal charge against the respondent arising from alleged abuse against an individual.

(v) In determining whether court records should be shielded under this paragraph, the court shall balance the privacy of the petitioner or the respondent and potential danger of adverse consequences to the petitioner or the respondent against the potential risk of future harm and danger to the petitioner and the community.

(vi) Information about the proceeding may not be removed from the Domestic Violence Central Repository.

(f) Access to shielded record. -- (1) This section does not preclude the following persons from accessing a shielded record for a legitimate reason:
(i) a law enforcement officer;

(ii) an attorney who represents or has represented the petitioner or the respondent in a proceeding;

(iii) a State's Attorney;

(iv) an employee of a local department; or

(v) a victim services provider.

(2)
(i) A person not listed in paragraph (1) of this subsection may subpoena, or file a motion for access to, a record shielded under this section.

(ii) If the court finds that the person has a legitimate reason for access, the court may grant the person access to the shielded record under the terms and conditions that the court determines.

(iii) In ruling on a motion under this paragraph, the court shall balance the person's need for access to the record with the petitioner's or the respondent's right to privacy and the potential harm of unwarranted adverse consequences to the petitioner or the respondent that the disclosure may create.

(g) Compliance with order. -- Within 60 days after entry of an order for shielding under this section, each custodian of court records that are subject to the order of shielding shall advise in writing the court and the respondent of compliance with the order.

(h) Regulations. -- The Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention, in consultation with the Maryland Judiciary, may adopt regulations governing online access to shielded records by a victim services provider. MD Code Fam. Law. 4-512 Shielding of records (Maryland Code (2019 Edition))

Converting Arrest Warrants to Criminal Summons in Montgomery County

A question which I receive in Montgomery County is whether an arrest warrant can be quashed or converted to a summons. The general answer in Montgomery County is in the negative. I was successful in converting an arrest warrant in Prince Georges County. In that case the prosecutor consented to the request.

Below is directly from our administrative judge:

It is the position of our District Court that it does not have authority to convert an unserved arrest warrant to a criminal summons. District Court administrative regulation XV authorizes judges to recall bench warrants and failure to appear warrants only. Arrest warrants issued by commissioners must be served on the defendant.

A possible exception is that the state's attorney can intervene and take action prior to service of a warrant on a defendant.